for example. The lawyer’s minion, the police officer, goes out on the public rights of
way to solicit business for his master, the prosecuting attorney for the CITY OF
CORRUPTION or the COUNTY OF TYRANNY, both of which are corporate
instrumentalities of the STATE OF CONFUSION. This solicitation of business for
the lawyer by the police officer is called Champerty.4 Champerty is, or at least used
to be, a tort and a crime at common law.
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| In the land of the blind the one eyed man is KING! |
regulation, let’s say for driving an unregistered motor vehicle, arrests him, and
issues a citation on the presumption that the “offender” is bound in some
undisclosed manner to the maritime jurisdiction, a presumption probably created by
the existence of the state driver license, or on the presumption that the STATE has
acquired an interest in the “motor vehicle” being driven by the offender, or on the
presumption that the STATE has an interest in the offender himself. On threat of
imprisonment, the cop forces the “offender” to sign a “citation” as a promise to
appear in a certain court at a certain time. This citation is a contract to compel
specific performance. The cop signed and the offender signed. It looks like a
legitimate contract, except for a couple of problems.
The first problem is that it was signed under a threat. That alone should be
enough to void the contract. The second problem is that the cop did not pay any
“consideration” to the offender to perform. Want of consideration is always a defense
under the Texas Business and Commerce Code, (same as the UCC) Sec. 3.408,
unless there is an underlying or “antecedent” obligation, and there is no evidence of
an antecedent obligation, but it is presumed. A third problem is the
unconscionability of the contract. The authors will not discuss unconscionability5
here, except to say that it is unconscionable to force someone to contract under
threat, coercion, or duress and unconscionability can be grounds to void a contract.